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1 Introduction
In Nash implementation theory, it is Maskin?s Theorem (Maskin, 1999) which
shows that when the planner faces at least three agents, a social choice corre-
spondence (SCC) is implementable in (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria (hence-
forth, Nash-implementable) if it satis?es Maskin monotonicity and no-veto
power ; conversely, any Nash-implementable SCC is Maskin-monotonic. Two
issues pertaining to this theorem stand out. First, it does not provide a
complete characterization of Nash-implementable SCCs, since no-veto power
is not necessary for Nash implementation. Second, a canonical mechanism
proposed in this theorem, which requires each agent to report a preference
pro?le, a feasible social outcome, and an integer, is not so attractive. This
is because the message space of this mechanism is rather large and announc-
ing all other agents? preferences is undesirable in terms of the informational
e¢ciency of decentralized decision making (on this point see, for instance,
Hurwicz, 1960).
Moore and Repullo (1990) address the ?rst issue by providing, without
any domain restriction, a necessary and su¢cient condition, called Condi-
tion ¹, for Nash implementability of SCCs in societies with more than two
agents.1 In contrast to the ?rst issue, the issue of informational e¢ciency
is addressed by Saijo (1988), which shows that proposing a mechanism with
strategy-space reduction (henceforth, s-mechanism) would su¢ce to guaran-
tee Maskin?s Theorem. Note that, in s-mechanisms, each agent is requested
to announce, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer, her own
and her neighbor?s preferences solely. Yet, as Moore and Repullo (1990) also
use a canonical mechanism for showing the full characterization and Saijo
(1988) does not discuss a full characterization of Nash implementation, it
leaves unclear not only whether Moore and Repullo?s result indispensably
relies on canonical mechanisms but also whether s-mechanisms can Nash-
implement any other SCC than Maskin-monotonic and no-veto power ones.
In this paper, we address the issue of what constitutes the necessary and
su¢cient condition for Nash implementation by s-mechanisms. We introduce
a new condition (labelled, Condition ¹s) which fully characterizes the class
1Note that, for two person societies, Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen
(1991) independently provided necessary and su¢cient conditions for Nash implemen-
tation, whereas even in societies with more than two agents, there are other works on
complete characterizations of Nash implementation under some domain restrictions, such
as Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992).
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of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms. Surprisingly, Condition ¹s
is equivalent to Condition ¹. This implies that the full characterization by
Moore and Repullo (1990) works even if canonical mechanisms are excluded
and the available class of mechanisms is restricted to that of s-mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce notation
and de?nitions. In Section 3, we state and prove our results.
2 Preliminaries
The set of (social choice) environments is (N;X; Rn), where N ´ f1; :::; ng
is a set of n ¸ 3 agents, X ´ fx; y; z; :::g is the set of attainable alternatives
(or outcomes), and Rn is the set of admissible preference pro?les (or states
of the world). Henceforth, we assume that the cardinality of X is #X ¸ 2.
Let R (X) be the set of all complete preorders on X. We assume that Rn ´
R1£ :::£Rn is a non-empty subset of the n-fold Cartesian product Rn (X) ´
R (X)£ :::: £ R (X)| {z }
n-times
. An element of Rn is denoted by R ´ (R1; :::; Rn),
where its `-th component is R` 2 R`, for each ` 2 N . For any preference
pro?le R 2 Rn and any ` 2 N , let R¡` be the list of elements of R for all
agents except `, i.e., R¡` ´ (R1; :::; R`¡1; R`+1; :::; Rn). Given a list R¡` and
R` 2 R`, we denote by (R¡`; R`) the preference pro?le consisting of these R`
and R¡`. For any (R`; x) 2 R` £X , agent `?s weakly lower contour set of R`
at x is given by L (R`; x) ´ fy 2 Xj (x; y) 2 R`g. For each ` 2 N and each
R` 2 R`, maxR` X ´ fx 2 Xj (x; y) 2 R` for all y 2 Xg.
We also assume that N and X are ?xed throughout the following discus-
sion, so that the set of environments is boiled down to Rn. A social choice
correspondence (SCC) is a correspondence F : Rn ³ X with F (R) 6= ? for
all R 2 Rn. An SCC F is (Maskin-)monotonic if, for all R; R0 2 Rn with
x 2 F (R), we have that x 2 F (R0) whenever L (R`; x) µ L (R0`; x) for all
` 2 N .2 An SCC F satis?es no-veto power if, for all R 2 Rn, we have that
x 2 F (R) whenever x 2 maxR` X for at least n ¡ 1 agents.
A mechanism (or game-form) is a pair ° ´ (M;g), where M ´ M1 £
::: £ Mn, and g : M ! X is the outcome function. Denote a generic
message (or strategy) for agent ` by m` 2 M` and a generic message pro-
?le by m = (m1; :::;mn) 2 M . For any m 2 M and ` 2 N , let m¡` ´
(m1; :::; m`¡1; m`+1; :::; mn). Let M¡` ´ £j2Nnf`gMj. Given m¡` 2 M¡` and
2Weak set inclusion is denoted by µ.
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m` 2 M`, denote by (m`; m¡`) the message pro?le consisting of these m` and
m¡`. Given R 2 Rn and ° = (M; g), (°;R) constitutes a (non-cooperative)
game. Given a game (°; R), m 2 M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of
(°; R) if and only if, for all ` 2 N , (g (m) ; g (m0`; m¡`)) 2 R` for all m0` 2 M`.
Let NE (°; R) denote the set of Nash equilibria of (°; R), whereas denote the
set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (°; R) by NA (°;R) ´ g (NE (°; R)).
A mechanism ° = (M; g) implements F in Nash equilibria, or simply
Nash-implements F , if and only if NA (°; R) = F (R) for all R 2 Rn. An
SCC F is Nash-implementable if there is such a mechanism.
Moore and Repullo (1990) show that, under the society with more than
two agents, the following condition is the necessary and su¢cient condition
for any SCC to be Nash-implemetable.
Condition ¹ (for short, ¹): An SCC F satis?es ¹ if there exists a set
Y µ X, and for all R 2 Rn and for all x 2 F (R), there is a pro?le of sets
(C` (R; x))`2N such that x 2 C` (R; x) µ L (R`; x) \ Y for all ` 2 N , and for
any R¤ 2 Rn:
(i) if C` (R;x) µ L (R¤` ; x) for all ` 2 N , then x 2 F (R¤);
(ii) for each i 2 N , if y 2 Ci (R; x) µ L (R¤i ; y) and Y µ L (R¤` ; y) for all
` 2 Nn fig, then y 2 F (R¤);
(iii) if y 2 Y µ L (R¤` ; y) for all ` 2 N , then y 2 F (R¤).
3 Results
Following Saijo (1988), we focus on mechanisms in which each agent reports
her own preference R` 2 R`, her neighbor?s preference R`+1 2 R`+1, an
outcome x 2 Y µ X, and an integer k 2 N .
De?nition 1: A mechanism (M; g) is s-mechanism if, for any ` 2 N ,
M` ´ R` £ R`+1 £ Y £ N , where Y µ X and ` + 1 = 1 if ` = n.
De?nition 2: An SCC F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if
there exists an s-mechanism (M; g) such that:
i) for all R 2 Rn, F (R) = NA (°; R); and
ii) for all R 2 Rn and all x 2 F (R), if m` =
¡
R`; R`+1; x; k
`
¢ 2 M` for all
` 2 N , with ` + 1 = 1 if ` = n, then m 2 NE (°; R) and g (m) = x.
We now introduce a condition, labelled Condition ¹s, to characterize
Nash implementability by s-mechanisms. The condition can be stated as
follows.
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Condition ¹s (for short, ¹s): An SCC F satis?es condition ¹s if there exists
a set Y µ X , and for all R 2 Rn and for all x 2 F (R), there is a pro?le of
sets
¡
C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢¢
`2N such that x 2 C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ µ L (R`; x)\ Y for
all ` 2 N , with ` + 1 = n if ` = n, and for all R¤ 2 Rn:
(i) if C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ µ L (R¤` ; x) for all ` 2 N , then x 2 F (R¤);
(ii) for all i 2 N , if y 2 Ci
¡
R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ L (R¤i ; y) and Y µ L (R¤` ; y) for all
` 2 Nn fig, then y 2 F (R¤);
(iii) if y 2 Y µ L (R¤` ; y) for all ` 2 N , then y 2 F (R¤).
Proposition 1. An SCC F satis?es ¹s if it is Nash-implementable by an
s-mechanism.
Proof. Let an SCC F be Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism. Then,
since it is Nash-implementable, it satis?es ¹. Thus, there exists a set Y µ
X, and for all R 2 Rn and for all x 2 F (R), there is a pro?le of sets
(C` (R; x))`2N such that x 2 C` (R; x) µ L (R`; x)\Y for all ` 2 N . Moreover,
for any R¤ 2 Rn, ¹(i)-(iii) are satis?ed. Now, for each R 2 Rn and each x 2
F (R), let
¡
C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢¢
`2N be de?ned as C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ ´ C` (R; x)
for each ` 2 N . Then, F satis?es ¹s.
Proposition 2. An SCC F satisfying ¹s is Nash-implementable by an s-
mechanism.
Proof. Let ° ´ (M; g) be an s-mechanism. Suppose that F satis?es ¹s.
Fix any m 2 M , R 2 Rn, and x 2 X, and let m` =
¡
R``; R
`
`+1; x
`; k`
¢ 2
M`, where ` + 1 = 1 if ` = n, and where the announcement of agent ` 2 N
about agent ` + 1?s preferences is R``+1. We say that the message pro?le
m 2 M is:
(i) consistent with R and x if, for all ` 2 N , R`` = R`¡1` = R` and x` = x,
where ` ¡ 1 = n if ` = 1;
(ii) m¡i quasi-consistent with x and R, where i 2 N , if for all ` 2 N , x` = x,
and for all ` 2 Nnfi; i + 1g, R`` = R`¡1` = R`, Ri¡1i = Ri, Ri+1i+1 = Ri+1, and
[Rii 6= Ri or Rii 6= Ri+1], where j ¡ 1 = n if j = 1 for j 2 fi; `g;
(iii) m¡i consistent with x and R, where i 2 N , if for all ` 2 Nnfig, x` = x 6=
xi, and for all ` 2 Nnfi; i+1g, R`` = R`¡1` = R`, Ri¡1i = Ri and Ri+1i+1 = Ri+1,
where j ¡ 1 = n if j = 1 for j 2 fi; `g.
De?ne the outcome function g :M ! X as follows: For any m 2 M ,
Rule 1: m is consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where x 2 F ¡ ¹R¢, then
g (m) = x.
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Rule 2: For some i 2 N , m¡i is quasi-consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where
x 2 F ¡ ¹R¢, then g (m) = x.
Rule 3: For some i 2 N , m is m¡i consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where
x 2 F ¡ ¹R¢, and Ci ¡ ¹R¡fi;i+1g; x¢ 6= Y , then
g (m) =
½
xi if xi 2 Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢
x otherwise
.
Rule 4: Otherwise, g (m) = x`¤(m) where `¤ (m) ´ P
i2N
ki (mod n).3
Since F satis?es ¹s, it follows that, for any R 2 Rn and any x 2 F (R),
x 2 Y . We show that ° = (M;g) Nash-implements F . For, let R 2 Rn.
To show that F (R) µ NA (°; R), let x 2 F (R) and suppose that, for all
` 2 N , m` = (R`; R`+1; x; ¦), where ¦ 2 N is an arbitrary agent index. Since
m is consistent with x and R and x 2 F (R), it follows from Rule 1 that
g (m) = x. Suppose that ` 2 N deviates from m` to m¤` =
¡
R``;R
`
`+1; x
`; ¦¢ 2
M` such that (R`; R`+1; x) 6=
¡
R``;R
`
`+1; x
`
¢
. It follows from Rules 2-3 that
g (M`; m¡`) = C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢
if C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ 6= Y . It is obvious that
g (M`; m¡`) µ C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢
if C`
¡
R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢
= Y . Since F satis?es ¹s,
it follows that g (M`; m¡`) µ L (R`; x). As it holds for any ` 2 N , we have
m 2 NE (°;R) and so x 2 NA (°;R). Furthermore, this guarantees the
condition (ii) of De?nition 2.
Conversely, to show that NA (°; R) µ F (R), let m 2 NE (°; R). Con-
sider the following cases.
Case 1: m falls into Rule 1.
Then, m is consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where x 2 F ¡ ¹R¢. Thus,
g (m) = x. Take any ` 2 N . Suppose that C`
¡
¹R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ 6= Y . For any
y 2 C`
¡
¹R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢
, changing m` for m¤` =
¡
R``;R
`
`+1; y;¦
¢ 2 M` agent ` can
obtain y = g (m¤i ; m¡i), by Rule 3. In case Ci
¡
R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢
= Y , agent `
can attain any y 2 Y by Rule 4. Thus, C`
¡
¹R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢
= g (M`; m¡`) for
all ` 2 N . As m 2 NE (°; R), C`
¡
¹R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ µ L (R`; x) for all ` 2 N .
Therefore, x 2 F (R) by ¹s(i).
Case 2: m falls into Rule 2.
Then m is m¡i quasi-consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where x 2 F
¡
¹R
¢
.
Thus, g (m) = x. We proceed according the following sub-cases: 1) Rii 6= ¹Ri
and Rii 6= ¹Ri+1, and 2) Rii 6= ¹Ri and Rii = ¹Ri+1.4
3If the remainder is zero the winner of the game is agent n.
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Sub-case 2.1. Rii 6= ¹Ri and Rii 6= ¹Ri+1
Any ` 2 Nn fig can attain any y 2 Y n fxg by inducing Rule 4, so that
x 2 maxR` Y as m 2 NE (°; R). Take any y 2 Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢
. Suppose
that Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ 6= Y . By changing mi for m¤¶{ = ¡Rii;Rii+1; y; ¦¢ 2
Mi agent i can obtain y = g (m¤i ;m¡i), by Rule 3. In the case that
Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢
= Y , by changing mi for m¤¶{ =
¡
Rii; R
i
i+1; y; k
i
¢ 2 Mi
agent i can attain y = g (m¤i ; m¡i) by appropriately choosing k
i. It fol-
lows that Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ g (Mi; m¡i). Moreover, as m 2 NE (°; R),
Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ L (Ri; x). Therefore, x 2 F (R) by either ¹s(ii) or ¹s(iii).
Sub-case 2.2. Rii 6= ¹Ri and Rii+1 = ¹Ri+1
Let Rii = R
0
i. We distinguish whether x 2 F
¡
¹R0
¢
where ¹R0 ´ ¡ ¹R¡i; R0i¢
or not. Suppose that x =2 F ¡ ¹R0¢. Then the same reasoning used above for
sub-case 2.1 carries over into this sub-case, so that x 2 F (R). Otherwise,
let x 2 F ¡ ¹R0¢. Then, i ¡ 1 or i is the deviator. Agent ` 2 Nn fi ¡ 1; ig
can attain any y 2 Y n fxg by inducing Rule 4, so that x 2 maxR` Y
as m 2 NE (°; R). Since x 2 F ¡ ¹R¢, there exists C` ¡ ¹R¡f`;`+1g; x¢ µ Y
for each ` 2 Nn fi ¡ 1; ig, and so C`
¡
¹R¡f`;`+1g; x
¢ µ L (R`; x) by Y µ
L (R`; x) for each ` 2 Nn fi ¡ 1; ig. Observe that ¹R¡fi;i+1g = ¹R0¡fi;i+1g
and ¹R¡fi¡1;ig = ¹R0¡fi¡1;ig, so that Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢
= Ci
³
¹R0¡fi;i+1g; x
´
and
Ci¡1
¡
¹R¡fi¡1;ig; x
¢
= Ci¡1
³
¹R0¡fi¡1;ig; x
´
. Consider agent i ¡ 1 and take
any y 2 Ci¡1
¡
¹R¡fi¡1;ig; x
¢
. Let Ci¡1
¡
¹R¡fi¡1;ig; x
¢ 6= Y . By changing
mi¡1 into m¤¶{¡1 =
¡
Ri¡1i¡1;R
i¡1
i ; y;¦
¢ 2 Mi¡1 agent i ¡ 1 can obtain y =
g
¡
m¤i¡1; m¡(i¡1)
¢
, by Rule 3. In the case that Ci¡1
¡
¹R¡fi¡1;ig; x
¢
= Y ,
by changing mi¡1 for m¤i¡1 =
¡
Ri¡1i¡1; R
i¡1
i ; y; k
i
¢ 2 Mi, agent i ¡ 1 can
attain y = g
¡
m¤i¡1; m¡(i¡1)
¢
with appropriate choice of ki¡1. Therefore,
Ci¡1
³
¹R0¡fi¡1;ig; x
´
µ g ¡Mi¡1; m¡(i¡1)¢. By the same reasoning, we have that
Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ g (Mi; m¡i). Moreover, it follows from m 2 NE (°; R)
that Ci¡1
¡
¹R¡fi¡1;ig; x
¢ µ L (Ri¡1; x) and Ci ¡ ¹R¡fi;i+1g; x¢ µ L (Ri; x). There-
fore, x 2 F (R) by ¹s(i).
Case 3: m falls into Rule 3.
Then m is m¡i consistent with x and ¹R 2 Rn, where x 2 F
¡
¹R
¢
.
Therefore, Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ 6= Y . First, we show that Ci ¡ ¹R¡fi;i+1g; x¢ µ
g (Mi;m¡i). For any xi 2 Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ n fxg, consider m¤i = ¡Rii; Rii+1; xi; ¦¢.
4The sub-case Rii = ¹Ri and R
i
i+1 6= ¹Ri+1 is not explicitly considered as it can be proved
similarly to the sub-case 2.2 shown below.
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Then, Rule 3 implies that g (m¡i; m¤i ) = xi. On the other hand, to attain x
agent i can induce Rule 1 by changing mi to m¤i =
¡
¹Ri; ¹Ri+1; x;¦
¢
so that
g (m¡i;m¤i ) = x. Hence, Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ g (Mi; m¡i).
Next, we claim that g (M`; m¡`) = Y for any ` 2 Nn fig. We proceed
according to whether #Y = 2 and n = 3 or not.
Sub-case 3.1. not[#Y = 2 and n = 3]
Suppose that #Y > 2. Take any ` 2 Nn fig. Then, agent ` can induce
the modulo game by choosing any y 2 Y n fx; xig and changing m` into
m¤` =
¡
R``;R
`
`+1; y; k
`
¢
. To attain y agent ` has only to adjust k` by which
`¤ (m¡`; m¤`) = `. To attain x (resp., x
i) agent ` has only to adjust k` by which
`¤ (m¡`; m¤`) = j for j 2 Nn f`; ig (resp., `¤ (m¡`; m¤`) = i). Therefore, Y µ
g (M`; m¡`) for any ` 2 Nn fig. Otherwise, let #Y = 2. Then, n > 3. Take
any ` 2 Nn fig. Choosing x` = xi, agent ` can make #©` 2 N jx` = xª ¸ 2
and #
©
` 2 N jx` 6= xª ¸ 2. As the outcome is determined by Rule 4 agent
` can attain any outcome in Y by appropriately choosing k`. Therefore,
Y µ g (M`;m¡`) for any ` 2 Nn fig.
Sub-case 3.2. #Y = 2 and n = 3
Then, let N = fi ¡ 1; i; i+ 1g with i + 1 = 1 if i = n and i ¡ 1 = n
if i = 1. As Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ 6= Y , it follows that g (m) = x. We proceed
according to whether for some agents `; `0 2 N , with ` 6= `0, #R` 6= 1 and
#R`0 6= 1 or not.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.1. For `; `0 2 N , with ` 6= `0, #R` 6= 1 and #R`0 6= 1
In this case, agent i¡1 (resp., i+1) can always induce the modulo game
by appropriately changing the announcement of her own preference or that of
her successor and by carefully choosing the outcome announcement. Finally,
to attain xi, agent i ¡ 1 (resp., i+ 1) has only to adjust the integer index so
that agent i becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.2. For some `; `0 2 N , with ` 6= `0, #R` = 1 or #R`0 = 1
Suppose that, for all ` ¤ 2 fi ¡ 1; i; i+ 1g, #R`¤ = 1. As m falls
into Rule 3, it follows that x 2 F (R) = F ¡ ¹R¢. Otherwise, let us con-
sider the case that, for some `¤ 2 fi ¡ 1; i; i+ 1g, #R`¤ 6= 1. If either
#Ri¡1 > 1 or #Ri > 1, then agent i ¡ 1 can induce the modulo game by
changing mi¡1 into either m¤i¡1 =
¡
Ri¡1i¡1; ¹Ri; x; k
i¡1¢ with Ri¡1i¡1 6= ¹Ri¡1 (if
#Ri¡1 > 1), or m¤i¡1 =
¡
¹Ri¡1; R
i¡1
i ; x
i; ki¡1
¢
with Ri¡1i 6= Rii (if #Ri > 1).
To attain xi, agent i ¡ 1 has only to choose an appropriate ki¡1 so that
i = `¤
¡
m¡(i¡1); m¤i¡1
¢
. Therefore, Y µ g ¡Mi¡1; m¡(i¡1)¢. Then, let#Ri¡1 =
#Ri = 1. Agent i¡1 can change mi¡1 into m¤i¡1 =
¡
¹Ri¡1; ¹Ri; xi; ki¡1
¢
. Sup-
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pose that xi =2 F ¡ ¹Ri¡1; ¹Ri; Rii+1¢. Then, Rule 4 applies, and agent i ¡ 1
can attain xi by adjusting ki¡1 so that i ¡ 1 = `¤ ¡m¡(i¡1); m¤i¡1¢. Sup-
pose that xi 2 F ¡ ¹Ri¡1; ¹Ri; Rii+1¢. If Ci+1 ¡ ¹Ri; xi¢ = fxig, Rule 3 implies
g
¡
m¡(i¡1); m¤i¡1
¢
= xi. In the case that Ci+1
¡
¹Ri; x
i
¢
= Y , the outcome is
determined by Rule 4, so that by adjusting ki¡1 agent i ¡ 1 can attain xi.
By similar reasoning, it can be shown that agent i + 1 can attain xi 2 Y .
Therefore, Y µ g (M`; m¡`) for ` 2 fi ¡ 1; i+ 1g.
In all sub-cases, we obtained Y µ g (M`; m¡`) for all ` 2 Nn fig. As
m 2 NE (°; R), we have that Ci
¡
¹R¡fi;i+1g; x
¢ µ L (Ri; g (m)) and g (m) 2
maxR` Y for any ` 2 Nn fig, so that g (m) 2 F (R) by ¹s(ii).
Case 4: m falls into Rule 4.
Then the outcome is determined by the modulo game so that g (m) =
x`
¤(m), where agent `¤ (m) 2 N is the winner of the modulo game. Thus,
Y µ g (M`;m¡`) for ` 2 N . Since m 2 NE (°;R), it follows that g (m) 2
maxR` Y for ` 2 N . Therefore, g (m) 2 F (R) by ¹s(iii).
From the above propositions, we obtain the following main theorem.
Theorem. An SCC F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if and
only if it satis?es ¹s.
Furthermore, we can see that the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by
s-mechanisms is not proper subset of the class of Nash-implementable SCCs.
Lemma. ¹s is equivalent to ¹.
Proof. From Proposition 1 and Moore and Repullo (1990), it is su¢cient to
show that ¹s implies ¹. Let an SCC F satisfy ¹s. Then, by Theorem, this F
is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism, so that it is Nash-implementable.
Thus, by Moore and Repullo (1990), F satis?es ¹.
From Theorem and Lemma, the following corollary holds:
Corollary. An SCC F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if and
only if it is Nash-implementable.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we deal with the informational e¢ciency issue pertaining to
Maskin?s Theorem (Maskin, 1999). We focus on s-mechanisms in which each
agent reports to the planner her own preference and her neighbor?s preference
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solely, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer. We introduce
a new condition, labelled Condition ¹s, which fully characterizes the class
of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms. Surprisingly, Condition ¹s
is equivalent to Condition ¹. This has two important implications for Nash
implementation. First, the class of Nash-implementable SCCs is equivalent
to the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by s-mechanisms. Second, even
though our condition is stated in terms of the existence of certain sets, it can
easily be checked in practice by the agorithm provided by Sjöström (1991).
Note that our results are in line with other well known results of Nash
implementation in economic environments. In particular, the equivalent rela-
tionship between Nash implementation by s-mechanism and Nash implemen-
tation by canonical mechanisms in general social choice environments is anal-
ogous to the equivalent relationship between Nash implementation by nat-
ural allocation mechanisms and Nash implementation by natural quantity2
mechanisms (Saijo et al, 1996). Moreover, Tatamitani (2001) provides a full
characterization of Nash implementation by self-relevant mechanisms, which
together with this paper indicates that a further reduction of the strategy
spaces of s-mechanisms drastically decreases the class of Nash-implementable
SCCs. This is parallel to the case of natural implementation in economic
environments, in which the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by natural
quantity mechanisms is much smaller than the Nash-implementable ones by
natural quantity2 mechanisms.
In contrast, whenever we modify the standard framework of implemen-
tation theories to a more practical framework by introducing an element of
perspectives from behavioral economics, the above mentioned relationship
obtained in this paper would not preserve. To be more speci?c, Matsushima
(2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) introduce the notion of a partially hon-
est agent as an element of behavioral economic perspectives, and consider
Nash implementation problems with an assumption that there is at least one
partially honest agent who not only has the standard self-interested pref-
erence on consequences but also has an intrinsic preference on truth-telling
behavior. In such a framework, the equivalent relationship between Nash im-
plementaion and Nash implemantaion by s-mechanisms no longer holds, as
Lombardi and Yoshihara (2010) show. This suggests that the equivalent re-
lationship indispensably relies on the standard assumption of self-interested
behaviors.
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